WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS - A MODEL FOR PHILOSOPHICO-LINGUISTIC COHERENCE

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show that the teacher's role as researcher of the language knowledge in the teaching is particularly important, even in the making ethical decisions in the classroom. Wittgenstein told Ludwig von Ficker that the point of the Tractatus was ethical. The value of the Tractatus consists in two things: "that thoughts are expressed in it" and "that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved." At the end of the book Wittgenstein says "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical".

Key words: knowledge, philosophy of language, semantics, education, values

In fact all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order”
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.5563)

INTRODUCTION

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is one of the most original philosophers and linguists of the twentieth century. In his works he studies the language as the only logical structured code that lies at the heart of the ontological base of the world. According to him, the language does not unite the universal logical structure, but it consists of various substructures ("language games") derived from a multitude of different languages. Every true statement, according to Wittgenstein, is a logical picture of a possible condition of things that has the same formal structure as the true statement it depicts.

The only work Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his life, dedicating it to his friend David Pinsent, is Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The treatise is known for its strict and compact style of writing. By carefully numbered views and declarative sentences that are treated as self-evident, the tract attracts the curiosity of a whole generation of philosophers and linguists. The work does not contain arguments, but consists of statements that are hierarchically numbered in seven basic levels, while each sub-level is an explanation or commentary on a higher-level statement (for example, 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.12). The seven basic levels in the treatise are:

1 Specialized paper
1. The world is as it is the chance.
2. As is the chance - the fact - such is the state of things.
3. A logical picture of the facts is the thought.
4. Thought is a suggestion with a sense.
5. The proposal is a true function of elementary statements
6. The general form of the true function is \([p, E, N (E)]\) and it is the general form of the statement.
7. The test must overcome the proposals and see the world as an order. What we can not talk about, we need to go into silence.

At the end of the work, there is an index that includes the more interesting words and gives all of their occurrences in the book. The listing of the Index belongs to translators Pers and Mac Guinness.

**PHILOSOPHICO-LINGUISTIC COHERENCE**

Not only is the Philosophical Investigation but also of course the Tractatus of Wittgenstein of great importance in the history of linguistic thought. The linguistic theories play an essential part in the structure of Tractatus (De Mauro, 2013).

In the first level (World is as it is the case), Wittgeinstein briefly states that the world is a whole of facts and that the facts, subordinated in a logical space, oppose the chance. This claim can be regarded as the basis of his metaphysical point of view by which he supports his conception of language as an image. The definition of a system of communication that can be termed "language" must set certain criteria on which basis it can be unambiguously decided whether something is or is not a sign of a particular language system, that is, whether or not any activity is or not is an act of interpretation of a sign or image that belongs to the set of signs.

In the second level (What is the coincidence - the fact - such is the state of things), Wittgenstein argues that the world we perceive does not consist of the essence but of the facts. This epistemological representation is further clarified by discussion of the term and the thing as metaphysical substances. The notion is presented as a static, immutable form which is considered a conjecture of the essence. However, the opposite view denies that there is no immutable form and that the old one is subject to constant change. Although this attitude of Wittgenstein largely explicitly attacks the universals, however, the idea of a general concept is related to other ideas that relate to the structure of language. The very idea of the private language argument is inherently built upon a limit. Through it, Wittgenstein poses a paradox to us: in examining the limitations of language, it is impossible to determinate what the limit is from the angle at which language no longer plays a role. In this light, language is the currency of comprehension (Robb, 2010).

The third level (The logical picture of the facts is the thought) promotes the thesis of language as a visual phenomenon in the world. This can be summarized as follows: The world consists of a totality of interconnected facts, and the facts are associated with the help of suggestions that make "images" for the world. In order for a picture to represent a certain fact, it must, in some way, possess the same logical structure as the fact. The picture is a standard of reality. In this way, the linguistic expression can be seen as a form of geometric projection, where language is the variable form of projection, while the logical structure of the expression is hidden in the invariable geometric relationships.
The fourth level (Thought is a sense proposition) contains Wittgenstein's most explicit message about the difference between material and grammatical statements. Namely, he argues that most of the proposals and questions that need to be found in philosophical works are not false, but meaningless. Consequently, we can not give any answer to the so-called "eternal questions", but we can only point out that they are meaningless. Most unsolvable questions stem from our failure to understand the logic of our language. If the form of our argument is valid, then the connection of the statement will be logically equivalent to the conclusion. Thus, the concept of tautology is a central motive in this part of Wittgenstein's book. According to him, the "ideal" language can not give meaning to the world, but only reflects its facts. Therefore, sentences in one language can not make sense if they are not reflections on the facts.

Fifth level (The proposal is the true function of elementary statements) is an explanation of the ability of language and thought to represent the world as a whole. Wittgenstein is largely concerned with studying the proposals and investigating how they function in correspondence with the truth of elementary statements. According to his first premise, proposals can "present" the world in a certain way, that is, either true or false. For example, the statement "There is a tree in the yard" is true if and only if there is wood in the yard. The images of language, according to Wittgenstein, are suggestions of the pictorial form of the world, but they can not represent their own logical essence, nor can they say what they have in common with reality. Since all suggestions, based on what are images, make sense regardless of reality, from the very proposal we can not see whether it is a truth or a lie, that is, the proposal can not say anything about the world or describe any fact in it.

The sixth level (The general form of the true function is \([p, E, N(E)]\) and it is the general form of the statement). According to the traditional reading of the treatise, Wittgenstein's views on logic and language led him to believe that some traits of language and reality can not be expressed in sensual language, but can only be "displayed" in the form of certain expressions. Thus, for example, according to the theory of the picture, when a statement is expressed or expressed, the proposal represents the reality (real or false) by sharing some characteristics with that reality. However, those characteristics are something that Wittgenstein claimed that we can not say what it is because we can not describe the relationship that the images carry with what they represent, but merely to show it through the fact that it states the statements \([p, E, N(E)]\). Thus, we can not say that there is a correspondence between language and reality, but the correspondence itself can be shown because our language is not capable of describing its own logical structure. Reality is not a product of human language. If we concieve of reality as comprising the various things we refer to in language and the facts we state in term of it, including the existence of those things which we name, then it reality would be absurd to claim that all this is a product of our language and, therefore, not independent of the language we speak (Diliman, 2016).

The seventh level (the story must overcome the proposals and see the world as an order. What we can not talk about, we need to pass in silence). Speaking and thinking are different activities whose practical governance does not have a logical side. The logical articulation of the activity itself can be made clear in terms of what is involved in our consciousness. All statements are of equal value. Everything in the world is coincidental (only the logic is necessary), and so nothing in the world can have transcendental value. If something has value or meaning, that value or meaning must lie outside the world. Even if it has value or meaning, we can not talk about it, because it lies outside the world and hence out of the kingdom of what can be said.
Everyone knows the word for seeing, keys, or a desk, as everyone knows the word for Goodness, Beauty, or Equality. And the only way to deal with such a claim would be to engage the question Carnap here passes over in silence (Hallett, 2008).

**CONCLUSION**

As a conclusion, we will mention only a few important representative proposals of the book:

1. The world is such as it is the chance.
2. The proposal is a picture of reality.
3. "Logical constants "are not representatives of logical facts.
4. Suggestions show the logical form of reality.
5. What can be shown can not be said.
6. The general form of the proposal is: "This is the way things stand".
7. To give the essence of the proposal means to give the essence of the whole description, and thus the essence of the world.
8. The boundaries of my language mean the boundaries of my world.

Ethics and aesthetics (which Wittgenstein takes as their equivalent) can not be put into words because they make judgments about value. The actions are not good or bad because of their consequences, but because of the overall attitude towards life they embody. While the exercise of will does not have a direct impact on the world itself, this exercise of will defines the kind of world that a person lives:

"The world of the happy man is different from that of the unhappy man."

**References:**